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COMMENTS 
Software Taxation: A Critical Reevaluation of . 
the Notion of Intangibility 
The computer industry originally marketed hardware1 and 
software2 components in mutually-dependent units through its 
hardware manufacturers. In 1969 IBM announced that it would 
no longer "bundle" hardware and software, an action that led to 
the formation of the independent software manufacturing indus- 
try? As the industry began to market software on an indepen- 
1. Hardware includes the central processing unit and "peripherals," i.e., printers, 
card readers, tape drives, disk storage devices, and telecommunication switching devices. 
2. In trade parlance software is generally the set of machine-readable programs that 
cause hardware to perform predetermined tasks. Programs may be "systems" programs, 
which control the internal operations of the central processing unit and the peripherals 
when commanded by "applications" programs or other systems programs. "Applications" 
programs interact with the user on a higher level; these programs perform functions such 
as payroll, billing, or scientific work. For a criticism of the emphasis the legal community 
has placed upon the systems/applications dichotomy, see note 22 infra. 
Software does not include program listings that describe the high-level algorithm of 
the program in a programming "language." Software also does not include documenta- 
tion, manuals, or any service. 
Technically speaking, software requires physical space for storage and may be repre- 
sented by electrical pulses in temporary storage or magnetic pulses similar to a sound 
recording in more permanent storage. Older technological applications represent 
software by a particular combination of punched holes in paper tape or cards. These 
representations are read by mechanical processes similar to that of a phonograph needle 
reading disk depressions. See generally Briefs Amici Curiae, Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 
219 (1976). 
3. Goetz, Unbundling: Will 80's Repeat the 60's?, COMPUTERWORLD, April 14, 1980, 
at 33. A computer vendor who "bundled" provided software and services with the hard- 
ware "free of charge." A vendee was forced to rely totally upon the selected hardware 
vendor's complementary packages. Goetz, When IBM Unbundled, COMPUTERWORLD, 
Dec. 31, 1979/Jan. 7, 1980, at  35. 
This hardware/software disunification radically changed the marketing practices of 
software manufacturers. Early programs were written for an end user on a one-to-one 
basis. T. D O L ~ A ,  M. BERNSTEIN, R. DICKSON, JR., N. FRANCE, B. ROSENBLATT, D. SMITH 
& T. STEEL, JR., DATA PROCESSING  1980-1985 (1976). The distinctions between product 
and service, vendor and vendee were often justifiably blurred. Today the software manu- 
facturer is a marketplace sophisticate whose ultimate economic stratagem is to distribute 
en masse commercial software-that is, in "off-the-shelf" packages for unknown 
users-to effectively compete with the declining unit costs of hardware technology. For a 
discussion of commercial software, see Frank, Commercial Software, COMPUTERWORLD, 
Dec. 31, 1979lJan. 7, 1980, at  18. 
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dent basis, the need arose for judicial arbitration of problems 
inherent in software ownership and sales. 
Because software has been difficult to visualize and concep- 
tualize,' it has been difficult to define. Courts and other con- 
cerned governmental entities, forced to categorize software as ei- 
ther tangible or intangible for tax and other purposes, have 
reached inconsistent conclusions. 
This Comment suggests that software is technologically tan- 
gible and that legal recognition of software tangibility is the 
most effective way to eliminate the inconsistent treatment 
software has received in federal and state tax decisions and from 
the Internal Revenue Service. If adopted, this approach would 
require the abandonment of precedent developed at a time when 
the character of software was not properly understood by tax 
authorities. This approach would, however, equalize the legal 
benefits and burdens that are now distributed on an unprinci- 
pled basis among manufacturers within and without the 
software industry. The net effect would be to place the software 
manufacturer in a legal posture similar to that of manufacturers 
of technologically analogous products. 
State courts with tax jurisdiction and the Internal Revenue 
Service (Service) have generally characterized software as intan- 
gible. At the state and local levels, this characterization exempts 
software from sales,' use: and personal property taxes: which 
4. All software goes through various stages of development. A brief examination of 
these stages may illustrate some of the reasons for definitional problems: 
(1) A systems analyst defines the needs of the user (current manual methods 
are examined). 
(2) The analyst details a description of the proposed computerized processes. 
(3) The analyst or programmer outlines the proposed processes in a general 
computer program format (a flowchart may be drawn). 
(4) The programmer translates the general program steps into a high-level lan- 
guage such as FORTRAN or COBOL. When this translation is keypunched or 
typed, it becomes machine readable "source" code. The code resides on mag- 
netic disk, magnetic tape, or cards. 
(5) The central processing unit translates this code through the use of another 
piece of software-the compiler-into "object" code which more closely corre- 
sponds with the machine's architecture for efficient processing. This object 
code is also stored and after extensive testing becomes the salable product. 
See generally NATIONAL COMMISSION O  NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED 
WORKS, FINAL REPORT (1979). , 
5. A sales tax is an impost on the consumption of commodities, assessed upon trans- 
actions within the jurisdiction. Although the concept of a sales tax is rather broad, it 
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turn on product or asset tangibility.' At the federal level, on the 
other hand, the characterization causes software owners to lose 
investment tax credit benefits and depreciation allowances nor- 
mally available for tangible assets. 
A. State and Local Characterizations 
Most state and local revenue departments which have con- 
sidered the issue have assumed that software is a tangible prod- 
uct or asset? When taxpayers have brought challenges, however, 
state courts have usually ruled to the contrary.1° These courts 
have characterized software as intangible and exempt from sales, 
use, and ad valorem personal property taxes. 
may be said that the element common to sales taxes is computation of the tax upon the 
gross amount involved in the sale of goods or other transaction upon which the tax is 
based. 68 AM. JUR. 2~ Sales and Use Taxes 5 1 (1973). 
6. A use or compensating tax imposes a levy upon the use in the state of property 
purchased outside the state. I t  is substantially complementary to the sales tax of particu- 
lar jurisdictions and is designed to discourage the loss of business within the jurisdiction 
because of the imposition of a local sales tax. Id. 5 171. 
7. Personal property taxes may extend to both tangibles and intangibles. The vari- 
ous forms of statutory assessments against intangibles are, however, different from other 
forms of taxation. 84 C.J.S. Taxation 5 78 (1954). Because local tax authorities have 
experienced some trouble in locating and taxing intangibles, a statutory provision or a 
"tacit policy of exclu[sion]" may totally or partially exempt intangibles from general per- 
sonal property taxes. See Bryant & Mather, Property Taxation of Computer Software, 
18 N.Y.L.F. 59, 67-68 (1972); Note, The Revolt Against the Property Tax on Software: 
An Unnecessary Conflict Growing Out of Unbundling, 9 SUFFOLK L. REV. 118, 125 n.28 
(1974). 
8. The Arizona statutory requirement of tangibility is typical: 
15. "Sale" includes any transfer of title or possession, or both, exchange, bar- 
ter, lease or rental, conditional or otherwise, in any manner or by any means 
whatever, of tangible personal property, for a consideration . . . . 
. . . .  
17. "Tangible personal property" means personal property which may be seen, 
weighed, measured, felt, touched or is in any other manner perceptible to the 
senses. 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 42-1301 (Supp. 1979). 
9. See generally [I9791 2 COMPUTER L. SEW. (BIGELOW) app. 2-3.2c, 2-3.2d (re- 
sponses to a recent survey of state revenue departments). 
10. District of Columbia v. Universal Computer Assocs., Inc., 465 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 
1972); State v. Central Computer Servs., Inc. 349 So. 2d 1160 (Ala. 1977); Honeywell 
Information Syss., Inc. v. Maricopa County, 118 Ariz. 171, 575 P.2d 801 (Ct. App. 1978); 
County of Sacramento v. Assessment Appeals Bd., 32 Cal. App. 3d 654, 671, 108 Cal. 
Rptr. 434,446 (1973); Honeywell Information Syss., Inc. v. Board of Assessment Appeals, 
(19801 7 COMPUTER L. SEW. REP. (BIGELOW) 486 (Colo. Dist. Ct. 1975); Nova Computing 
Servs., Inc. v. Askew, [I9801 6 COMPUTER L. SEW. REP. (BIGELOW) 18 (Fla. Div. Admin. 
Hearings 1976); Puritan Life Ins. Co., [I9801 7 COMPUTER L. SERV. REP. (BIGELOW) 481 
(R.I. Tax Div. 1979); Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538 S.W.2d 405 (Tenn. 1976); 
First Nat'l Bank of Fort Worth v. Bullock, 584 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979). 
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The first major state decision to consider the issue, District 
of Columbia v. Universal Computer Associates, Inc.,ll became 
an often cited precedent. In this 1972 decision the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit deter- 
mined that the software portion of a "bundled"12 system consti- 
tuted an intangible product exempt from the local sales tax. The 
court reasoned that software's tangible transporting mediumlS 
was "insignificant" to the transaction, the true object being in- 
tangible "knowledge" that "rest[ed] in the machine." After de- 
livery, the medium upon which the "knowledge" was carried 
could be destroyed, stored, or returned.14 Later decisions have 
relied upon Universal as highly persuasive, if not controlling, 
authority for the proposition that state and local tax agencies 
have wrongfully attempted to tax an intangible asset or good.16 
Other decisions have characterized software as an intangible 
for a variety of additional reasons. Unable to separate a list of 
purchased contract items into software and non-software catego- 
ries, one court labeled them all as software and, because of the 
tax authority's inclusion of intangible components, characterized 
the entire bundle as an intangible? Because a revenue authority 
attempted to tax only software transmitted on a tangible me- 
dium rather than by telecomm~nication,~~ another court con- 
strued this to be an admission by the tax authority that the true 
object of the transaction was an intangible." If alternative 
modes of transmission are available to the vendor, the courts 
have assumed that the object of the transaction is intrinsically 
11. 465 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
12. For a definition of "bundling," see note 3 supra. 
13. The medium in this case was punched cards. 465 F.2d at  617. Software media 
also include punched paper tape, magnetic tape, magnetic disk or electronic memory 
("core") itself. 
14. Id. a t  618. 
15. See State v. Central Computer Servs., Inc. 349 So. 2d 1160 (Ma. 1977); Honey- 
well Information Syss., Inc. v. Maricopa County, 118 Ariz. 171, 575 P.2d 801 (Ct. App. 
1978); Honeywell Information Syss., Inc. v. Board of Assessment Appeals, [I9801 7 COM- 
PUTER L. SERV. REP. (BIGELOW) 486 (Colo. Dist. Ct. 1975); Nova Computing Servs., Inc. v. 
Askew, [I9801 6 COMPUTER L. SEW. REP. (BIGELOW) 18 (Fla. Div. Admin. Hearings 1976); 
Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538 S.W.2d 405 (Tenn. 1976); First Nat'l Bank of 
Fort Worth v. Bullock, 584 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979). 
16. Honeywell Information Syss., Inc. v. Board of Assessment Appeals, [I9801 7 
COMPUTER L. SEW. REP. (BIGELOW) 486, 489, 491-92 (Colo. Dist. Ct. 1975). 
17. Computer programs and data may be communicated over microwave or tele- 
phone lines. For a technical discussion, see D. MCGLYNN, DISTRIBUTED PROCBSSING AND 
DATA COMMUNICATIONS (1978). 
18. Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538 S.W.2d 405, 407-08 (Tern. 1976). 
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intangible.la Finally, where courts have been unable to fully re- 
solve the basic issue of subject matter tangibility, they have typ- 
ically rendered pro-taxpayer decisions on the ground of 
ambiguity.20 
This characterization of software as intangible has met, 
however, with isolated but vigorous exception and dissent. In 
Greyhound Computer Corp. v. State Department of Assess- 
ments & Ta~ation,~l the Court of Appeals of Maryland, the 
state's highest court, separated from the tax authority's broad 
categorization of software those elements constituting actual 
machine software-systems programs.22 These programs were 
firmly characterized as tangible for property tax purposes.2s In 
State v. Central Computer Services, I ~ C . , ~ *  Alabama Justice 
Maddox contended in dissent that the majority's characteriza- 
tion of software as intangible had failed to properly deal with a 
related film industry decision.s6 He further implied that the ma- 
jority's reasoning was based on an obsolete approach not appli- 
cable to "computer age" techno10gy.~~ 
19. See cases cited note 79 infra. 
20. See cases cited note 95 infra. 
21. 271 Md. 674, 320 A.2d 52 (1974). 
22. Id. at  678-79, 320 A.2d a t  55. The technical distinction between "systems pro- 
grams" and "applications programs" is disappearing. Although hardware cannot operate 
without a systems program, systems programs often lose strict machine dependency; 
they may be designed to emulate another machine's characteristics by running the emu- 
lated machine's operating systema. For a technical example, see Bhandenkar & Roth- 
man, The Vax-11, DECDs 32-Bit Version of the PDP-11, DATAMATION, Feb. 1979, at  159. 
The industry sees little practical distinction in its marketing practices. IBM's un- 
bundling move also significantly affected the independent systems software manufactur- 
ing industry. The supposed closer ties to the hardware were of no significance to the 
marketing practices of compatible systems software. See generally Engle, Overview of 
Systems and Utility Packages, COMPUTERWORLD, Sept. 17, 1980, at  65. 
In the past, some have attached significance to systems software, considering it to be 
inextricably connected with the hardware and therefore entitled to treatment as a tangi- 
ble, whereas applications software may not be so entitled. See generally Note, The Re- 
volt Against the Property Tax on Software, supra note 7. The California statutory 
scheme taxes only systems programs and exempts the rest. CAL. REV. & TAX CODE $3 
995, 995.1, 995.2 (West Supp. 1980). 
23. 271 Md. a t  680,320 A.2d at  56. The court, however, cited Universal, 465 F.2d at  
615, and County of Sacramento, 32 Cal. App. 3d at  654, 108 Cal. Rptr. a t  434, both of 
which had characterized software as an intangible. The court made no attempt to distin- 
guish these former decisions. 271 Md. a t  680, 320 A.2d at 56. 
24. 349 So. 2d 1160 (Ala. 1977). 
25. Boswell v. Paramount Television Sales, Inc., 291 Ala. 490, 282 So. 2d 892 (1973), 
cited in State v. Central Computer Servs., 349 So. 2d at  1162, 1163 (Ala. 1977). 
26. State v. Central Computer Serva., 349 So. 2d at  1164. 
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B. Federal Characterizations 
In response to confusion among its agents,"' the Service 
promulgated Revenue Procedure 69-21?' in which unbundled 
software is specifically characterized as an intangible asset? 
Bundled software, however, receives distinctly different treat- 
ment. Without actually labeling bundled software a tangible as- 
set, Procedure 69-21 effectively permits it to be treated as tangi- 
ble by allowing the taxpayer to include software acquisition 
costs with those of the associated hardware?O Because the Ser- 
vice considers unbundled software intangible, it is therefore inel- 
igible for an investment tax credit under section 38 of the Inter- 
nal Revenue Code.s1 Therefore, in order to receive the benefits 
of the investment tax credit, a vendee must purchase software 
from one of the decreasing number of vendors who still bundle. 
Moreover, under Revenue Procedure 69-21, the software owner 
is precluded from selecting the advantageous depreciation meth- 
ods and schedules normally extended to owners of tangible 
 product^.^' To recover costs the software buyer must limit his 
depreciation to that defined in Revenue Procedure 69-21. The 
cash flow implications of this procedure can be staggering." 
The characterization of software as intangible for tax pur- 
poses is inconsistent with the general legal and technical defini- 
tions of product tangibility. Specifically, it is inconsistent with 
state and federal tax court characterizations of analogous prod- 
ucts, state court characterizations in software contract disputes, 
and pervasive trade usage. 
27. See generally Bigelow, Federal Software Taxation, [I9791 1 COMPUTER L. SERV. 
(BIGELOW) 5 2-3.2, Art. 1, at 2, 5 (1972). 
28. Rev. Proc. 69-21, 1969-2 C.B. 303. 
29. Id. $ 4. 
30. Id. 
Where such costa are included, without being separately stated, in the cost 
of the hardware (computer) and such costs are treated as a part of the cost of 
the hardware that is capitalized and depreciated [the service will not disturb 
the taxpayer's treatment of such costs] . . . . 
Id. 
31. "Section 38 property" does not include intangibles. I.R.C. 5 48(a)(l). 
32. See Bigelow, supra note 27, at  6-8. 
33. Id. at 2-6. 
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A. Analogous Products 
1. Machine-Coded Data 
Machine-coded data is physically equivalent to computer 
software. Both "products" may be represented binarily by either 
electronic, magnetic, or physical pulses in core, on magnetic disk 
or tape, or on paper card or tape. Both may be transmitted via 
telecommunications equipment. Both may be read by the same 
hardware mechanism. Just as one machine's software may be 
another machine's data, one machine's data may be another 
machine's s o f t ~ a r e . ~  The products, then, are technically 
indisting~ishable.~~ 
Despite these similarities, the state and federal courts have 
often characterized machine-coded data as a tangible product or 
asset. In so doing, the Fifth Circuit, in Texas Instruments, Inc. 
u. United States,a6 allowed the taxpayer to apply investment tax 
credit benefits to data acquisition costs. The court rejected the 
Service's contention that the tangible medium was merely inci- 
dental to the intangible information contained thereon: "The 
government's arguments, plausible as they may sound, simply 
refuse to recognize that the value of the . . . data is entirely de- 
pendent upon the existence of the tapes. . . 
State courts are split in their characterizations of machine 
coded data. The Ohio Supreme Court has characterized machine 
34. For example, one machine may use a previously constructed software program to 
build a second similar program for a different machine which would require different 
software characteristics (the second machine may require different input-output configu- 
rations or different addressing conventions). The first machine would "read" the original 
program in much the same way as it would read a "text" data file, searching for specific 
textual combinations and reacting in a predetermined manner while building the second 
program. The first machine's output, then, is mere output data that results from the 
machine's operation. However, to the aecond machine, this is not mere output data. The 
"data" may now act as a software program, performing the same functions as the original 
program designed for another machine. 
35. In fact, the outcome of a machine-coded data case may influence the actions of a 
revenue department in assessing software. In Janesville Data Center, Inc. v. Wisconsin 
Dep't of Revenue, 84 Wis. 2d 341, 267 N.W.2d 656 (1978), the court held this type of 
product to be intangible and non-taxable, leading to a memorandum from the Wisconsin 
Department of Revenue suggesting broader impact in the data processing industry. 
[I9791 2 COMPUTER L. SERV. (BIGELOW) app. 2-3.2d, at Wis. p. 20. 
36. 551 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1977). 
37. Id. at 611. Geophysical Service, Inc., a subsidiary of Texas Instruments, col- 
lected impulses resulting from seismic soundings. These impulses were refined and ed- 
ited by compuer and transcribed on the disputed tapes. The digital data in the tapes was 
used to produce a non-digital, analog picture of the soundings. Id. at 608. 
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coded data as tangible for tax purposes.88 The Wisconsin and 
Texas supreme courts, however, have characterized data as in- 
tangible and exempt from state taxation, rendering pro-taxpayer 
decisions on the ground of ambig~ i ty .~~  
2. Film and Videotape Products 
Film and videotape products are physically similar to the 
computer software product. AU three may be wholly or partially 
represented by magnetic pulses on magnetic tape or disk. All re- 
quire hardware to extract information contained on the me- 
di~m.~O All have value far above the cost of the transferring me- 
dium; all may be transmitted by telecommunications equipment; 
and finally, all may be physically imitated by "actors" or "pro- 
grammers" duplicating the work? 
The Service originally treated motion picture film and 
videotape products, like software, as intangible. The Ninth Cir- 
cuit, however, has rejected the Service's position and has charac- 
terized motion picture and videotape film products as tangible 
property for investment credit purposes." The first major deci- 
sion, Walt  Disney Productions v. United States," overturned 
Treasury Regulation 1.48-l(f), which had characterized the film 
product as an intangible asset. In the regulation the Service rea- 
soned that because the production of film involved such in- 
tangibles as manuscript costs, screenplay costs, and wardrobe 
design costs, the final product should be evaluated for tax pur- 
poses as an intangible." The Walt Disney cpurt criticized the 
Service's argument, commenting that an automobile production 
machine should therefore be largely intangible because many of 
its costs may be traced to invention, engineering, and labor 
38. Accountant's Computer Servs., Inc. v. Kosydar, 35 Ohio St. 2d 120, 132-33, 298 
N.E.2d 519, 527-28 (1973). 
39. See Bullock v. Statistical Tabulating Corp., 549 S.W.2d 166, 168-69 (Tex. 1977); 
Janesville Data Center, Inc. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 84 Wis. 2d 341,345-46, 267 
N.W.2d 656, 658 (1978). 
40. State v. Central Computer Servs., 349 So. 2d 1160,1165 (Ala. 1977) (Maddox, J., 
dissenting). 
41. Id. 
42. See Bing Crosby Prods. v. United States, 588 F.2d 1293, 1297-99 (9th Cir. 1979); 
Walt Disney Prods. v. United States, 549 F.2d 576, 580 (9th Cir. 1976); Walt Disney 
Prods. v. United States, 480 F.2d 66,68 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 934 (1974). 
Cf. District of Columbia v. Norwood Studios, Inc., 336 F.2d 746 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (sales 
tax case). 
43. 480 F.2d 66 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 934 (1974). 
44. Id. a t  67, 68. 
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 expenditure^.^^ 
The state courts have also concluded that film products are 
tangible property. Although most of a film product's value lies in 
its intangible copyright46 or intangible production servicest7 the 
courts have reasoned that the vendee desires a finished prod- 
u ~ t . ~ ~  Therefore, the courts have declared that the film product, 
despite its intangible elements, is tangible and subject to sales or 
personal property taxes.4a 
B. Software Contract Disputes 
Those courts that have handled software contract disputes 
have either expressly or impliedly brought software sales within 
the purview of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)?O Al- 
though these courts were not required to classify software prod- 
ucts as tangible in order to bring them within the UCC, they 
were obliged to apply to software products the "goods" label as 
defined within the UCC. The UCC defines goods to mean "all 
things . . . movable at the time of identification to the contract 
for sale."s1 Furthermore, "[gloods must be both existing and 
-- 
45. Id. at  68. 
46. Michael Todd Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 684, 689-94, 371 P.2d 
340, 343-45, 21 Cal. Rptr. 604, 605-08 (1962). 
47. District of Columbia v. Norwood Studios, Inc., 336 F.2d 746, 747 (D.C. Cir. 
1964). 
48. Id. at  747. 
49. E.g., District of Columbia v. Nomood Studios, Inc., 336 F.2d 746 (D.C. Cir. 
1964); Michael Todd Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 684, 371 P.2d 340,21 Cal. 
Rptr. 604 (1962). See also Boswell v. Paramount Television Sales, Inc., 291 Ala. 490, 282 
So. 2d 892 (1973) (levy assessment against film lease); Crescent Amusement Co. v. Car- 
son, 187 Tenn. 112, 213 S.W.2d 27 (1948) (levy assessment against film lease). 
In University Microfilms v. Scio Township, 76 Mich. App. 616, 257 N.W.2d 265 
(1977), the taxpayer sought to escape state taxation of his film product. The court chose 
not to apply a taxpayer's argument that film was similar to software and therefore intan- 
gible. Id. at  618, 257 N.W.2d a t  267. 
There has been recent, although limited, exception to this film tangibility rule. Al- 
though the court in Simplicity Pattern Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 101 Cal. App. 3d 
184, 161 Cal. Rptr. 558 (1980), characterized film as an intangible product, it based its 
reasoning on a statute exempting master sound tapes and records. The court construed 
this statute, although not controlling in the case, to be a "clear indication of legislative 
thinking." Id. at  188, 161 Cal. Rptr. a t  561. 
50. Chatlos Syss., Inc. v. National Cash Register Corp., 479 F. Supp. 738 (D.N.J. 
1979); Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 457 F. Supp. 765 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), 
reu'd on other grounds, 604 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1979); Carl Beasley Ford, Inc. v. Burroughs 
Corp., 361 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. Pa. 1973), a f d ,  493 F.2d 1400 (3d Cir. 1974); Burroughs 
Corp. v. Joseph Uram Jewelers, Inc., 305 So. 2d 215 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974). 
51. U.C.C. 8 2-105(1). 
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identified before any interest in them can pass."52 It is inconsis- 
tent to label an item as both intangible and a "good."5s 
Software may also be considered tangible for purposes of re- 
plevin. In F. & M. Schaefer Corp. v. Electronic Data Systems 
Corp. (EDS)," EDS delivered software to Schaefer. When 
Schaefer breached the payment terms, EDS filed a motion for 
replevin. The United States Court for the Southern District of 
New York held that EDS had made out a prima facie case for 
replevin.55 Schaefer's contention that programs were intangible 
and not subject to replevin was unpersuasive." The court had 
little difficulty in calling the disputed software "quite 
tangible."57 
C. Industrial Usage and Technological Definitions 
The software industry has characterized itself as a manufac- 
turer of tangible products rather than as a mere purveyor of in- 
tangible knowledge or services. In patent cases before the Su- 
preme Court," for example, software manufacturers have urged 
through briefs of amici curiae that the Court view software as an 
apparatus or machine." These software manufacturers have 
strictly limited software to the completely debugged and tested 
machine programPo rather than extending the definition to in- 
clude the broad categorization of such items as programs, list- 
ings, consulting services, and debugging services, which the early 
- - 
52. Id. 8 2-105(2). 
53. See Note, Computer Programs as Goods Under the U.C.C., 77 MICH. L. REV. 
1149, 1150, 1151 n.11 (1980). In Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 457 F. 
Supp. 765 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 604 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1979), the 
court labeled the furnishing of custom designed software as goods under the purview of 
the U.C.C., but, after citing F. & M. Schaefer Corp. v. Electronic Data Syss. Corp., 430 F. 
Supp. 988 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd mem., 614 F.2d 1286 (2d Cir. 1979), the court inexplica- 
bly adopted the fiction that software, although within the definition of U.C.C. "goods," is 
an intangible. 
54. 430 F. Supp. 988 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), a f d  mern., 614 F.2d 1286 (2d Cir. 1979). 
55. Id. at  989. 
56. Id. at  991. 
57. Id. at  992. 
58. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); Dam v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219 (1976); 
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 US. 63 (1972). For a recent commentary, see Gemignani, Le- 
gal Protection for Computer Software, 7 RUTCERS J. COMPUTERS & TECH. 269 (1980). 
59. Brief Amicus Curiae for Universal Software, Inc. at  10, 22, Dam v. Johnston, 
425 U.S. 219 (1976); Brief Amicus Curiae for Software Associates, Inc., at  13; Brief Ami- 
cus Curiae for The Association of Data Processing Services Organizations, Software In- 
dustry Association (ADAPSOISIA) a t  20. 
60. E.g., Brief Amicus Curiae for Universal Software, Inc. at  10. 
8591 SOFTWARE TAXATION 869 
software courts had difficulty labeling as tangible software. They 
have further declared that software alters the machine 
"semipermanently" causing the hardware to perform as a "new 
machine. "61 
Trade publications refer to software as a product, its makers 
as manufacturers, and8 its designers as  engineer^.^^ Large 
software houses subject their products to a rigorous quality as- 
surance analysis, evaluating function, size, performance, reliabil- 
ity, flexibility, maintainability, and portability." 
Although the definitions vary between legal advocates of 
patenting and those seeking tax exemptions, industry experts do 
not consider software to be formless, incorporeal "knowledge" 
resting within the hardware. They see it as a machine compo- 
nent, more analogous to electronic circuitry than to the printed 
program listing on an eye-readable document? 
The erroneous characterization of software in state tax deci- 
s i o n ~ ~ ~  stems from a general application of reasoning that is 
technologically inaccurate, from a misapplication of sound pre- 
61. Brief Amicus Curiae for Software Associates, Inc. .at 6, 11. "The technical reality 
is that program software causes new circuits to be formed in the general purpose ma- 
chine, thereby changing it to a special purpose machine or an enhancedlextended gen- 
eral purpose machine." Id. at  6 (emphasis in original). 
62. D. MCGLYNN, supra note 17, at  258; M. Goetz, "The 'What is Software' Legal 
Snafu," at 3-4 (June 6, 1978) (unpublished paper presented at the National Computer 
Conference, Anaheim, California, by Martin A. Goetz, Senior Vice President of Applied 
Data Research, Inc., Princeton, New Jersey). 
63. Patrick, Things are Looking Up for Software, DATAMATION, Jan. 1979, at 131. 
64. Goetz, supra note 62, at 3; Myers, What is Software?, DATAMATION, Mar. 1979, 
at 74. 
65. In a federal tax decision, the Tax Court of the United States in Computer Sci- 
ences Corp. v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 327 (1974), characterized software as an intangible 
asset for section 341 (collapsible corporations) purposes. Section 341 of the Internal Rev- 
enue Code requires for its application "the manufacture, construction, or production of 
property." The taxpayer argued that software was, in fact, not "property" at all, but 
"know-how" and "goodwill," and therefore not within the ambit of "property" in section 
341.63 T.C. at 343. The taxpayer's corporation was held not to be collapsible. Id. at  354. 
The court, however, conceded the taxpayer's argument that software was "intangible" 
but maintained that it was section 341 "property." Id. at 344. This conclusion was neces- 
sary for the court to address the issue upon which the case actually turned: the required 
intent to sell the corporation had not been formed before the required production of 
"property" had been completed. Id. at 354. The characterization of software as "prop- 
erty" was critical; its characterization as an intangible was not critical and was little 
more than an assumption. 
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cedent, and from a policy of deference to the taxpayer where the 
tax law is ambiguous. 
A. Insufficient Information and Technological Inaccuracies 
Insdcient technical information and technological inaccu- 
racies have served as the bases for poor precedent. Although 
many of the issues of tangibility confronting software litigants 
have surfaced in the machine-coded data and film industry tax 
disputes, the software tax courts have chosen to characterize 
software as an intangible asset and product. Several distinct rea- 
sons exist for this characterization. 
I .  Insufficient Technical Input 
' 
Courts have had difficulty rendering judgments in light of 
insufficient technical information. Tax authorities at times have 
been unable to articulate accurate definitions of software. Some 
tax authorities have insisted upon bringing obvious intangibles 
within a definition of software. In addition to computer pro- 
grams, they have included design and analysis, planning, prepa- 
ration of feasibility studies, debugging and testing, educational 
training and instructions, educational publications, tests, mea- 
surements, adjustments, repairs, and conversion a n a l y s i ~ . ~  If 
not limited solely to machine-executable, marketable programs, 
this cumbersome categorization becomes most "trouble~ome"~~ 
to the courts and they become "relu~tan[t]"~~ to allow the state's 
broad taxation. 
2. The "Intrinsic Intangibility" Assumption 
The courts have generally assumed that software is intrinsi- 
cally incorporeal and that it is mere intangible "knowledge" 
which "rests in the rna~h ine . '~~  This technologically inaccurate 
66. See Honeywell Information Syss., Inc. v. Maricopa County, 118 Ariz. 171, 180 
n.1, 575 P.2d 801,810 n.1 (Ct. App. 1978); Honeywell Information Syss., Inc. v. Board of 
Assessment Appeals, [I9801 7 COMPUTER L. SERV. REP. (BIGELOW) 486, 489 (Colo. Dist. 
Ct. 1975); Greyhound Computer Corp. v. State Dep't of Assessments & Taxation, 271 
Md. 674,678,320 A.2d 52,55 (1974). See also Annot., 82 A.L.R.3d 597,599 (1978) (sum- 
mary of state's brief in Greyhound). 
67. Greyhound Computer Corp. v. State Dep't of Assessments & Taxation, 271 Md. 
674, 677, 320 A.2d 52, 54 (1974). 
68. Honeywell Information Syss., Inc. v. Board of Assessment Appeals, [I9801 7 
COMPUTER L. SERV. REP. (BIGELOW) 486, 489 n.* (Colo. Dist. Ct. 1975). 
69. District of Columbia v. Universal Computer Assoc., Inc., 465 F.2d 615,618 (D.C. 
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portrayal of software arises from the Universal opinion and has 
been quoted or paraphrased with approval in other decisions?O 
These courts have premised this assumption on a simple but im- 
proper basis. Because the tape, disk, card, or other transferring 
medium may be stored, returned, or destroyed7' after being used 
by the vendee machine, the Universal court reasoned that the 
visible manifestation of software-the medium-is inconsequen- 
tial to the transa~tion.~~ Therefore, the court assumed, the ob- 
ject of the transaction must be intangible "knowledge" because 
the medium is inconsequentialTs The Universal court, however, 
failed to establish the connection between this assumption of 
product intangibility and the observation of medium inconse- 
quentiality. Other notable decisionsT4 have not questioned or 
qualified this reasoning and have not attempted to establish the 
critical connection. 
The technician would find this reasoning particularly diffi- 
cult to comprehend, knowing that software actually has physical 
properties of mass and volume. Software, defined as the ma- 
chine-readable end-product of program design," must possess 
physical properties to enable the host hardware unit to act in a 
predetermined manner. Although industry experts question the 
Cir. 1972). 
70. See State v. Central Computer Servs., Inc., 349 So. 2d 1160, 1162 (Ala. 1977); 
Honeywell Information Sysa., Inc. v. Board of Assessment Appeals, [I9801 7 COMPUTER 
L. SERV. REP. (BIGELOW) 486, 491 (Colo. Dist. Ct. 1975); Nova Computing Servs., Inc. v. 
Askew, [I9801 6 COMPUTER L. SERV. REP. (BIGELOW) 18, 27 (Fla. Div. Admin. Hearings 
1976); Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538 S.W.2d 405, 408 (Tenn. 1976). 
71. District of Columbia v. Universal Computer Assocs., Inc., 465 F.2d 615, 618 
(D.C. Cir. 1972). 
72. Id. 
73. Id. 
74. State v. Central Computer Servs., Inc., 349 So. 2d 1160,1162 (Ala. 1977); Honey- 
well Information Syss., Inc. v. Board of Assessment Appeals, [I9801 7 COMPUTER L. SERV. 
REP. (BIGELOW) 486, 491 (Colo. Dist. Ct. 1975); Nova Computing Servs., Inc. v. Askew, 
[I9801 6 COMPUTER L. SEW. REP. (BIGELOW) 18, 27 (Fla. Div. Admin. Hearings 1976); 
Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538 S.W.2d 405, 408 (Tenn. 1976). 
75. Brief Amicus Curiae for Universal Software, Inc. at  10, Dann v. Johnston, 425 
U.S. 219 (1976), states: 
Amicus CBEMA's basic misapprehension of the commercial realities of pro- 
gram machine design and implementation would lead one to confuse a flow- 
charted and coded finRnciai banking procedure with an effective procedure in 
the form of a completely debugged and tested program. Only the latter, i.e. the 
running program, is a commodity which is merchantable . . . . Absent this 
merchantable program machine, whether in the form of punched cards, mag- 
netic tape or disks, the general purpoee digital computer is not capable of solv- 
ing any problem. 
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analogy, labeling it ~implistic:~ software may be compared to a 
paper roll in a player piano." When the mechanical devices in a 
player piano encounter a physical aberration in the paper "mu- 
sic," a message is sent to alter the piano's existing state. Simi- 
larly, when the computer hardware experiences a magnetic, elec- 
tronic, or physical aberration in the tape, core," or paper 
medium, a message is sent to alter the computer's physical state. 
If the tape copy of the software has been destroyed but the ven- 
dee continues to use the software, the vendee has certainly dedi- 
cated a specific amount of volume and mass on tape, disk, card, 
or in core to store a copy of that software. This storage pre- 
cludes the storage of any other data or software in the allotted 
space. Similarly, the owner of a player piano may store his "mu- 
sic" on another roll and thereafter destroy the first. Destruction 
of the purchased roll does not, however, render the "music" 
intangible. 
3. The "Alternative Transmission Mode" Rationale 
The "alternative transmission mode" rationale, first applied 
by the Universal court, resulted from a combination of judicial 
and tax authority errors. This rationale, related to the intrinsic 
intangibility assumption previously discussed, merely reflects a 
conclusion that because a variety of software transfer methods 
exist, the essence of the transaction must be some intangible or 
the mere embodiment of services?@ These methods include not 
only visible media transfer by disk, tape, or card, but also direct 
76. Id. at 5-6; Brief Amicus Curiae for Software Associates, Inc. at 11. 
77. This analogy has been used often. A recent treatment may be found in First 
Security Bank of Idaho v. Commissioner, 592 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1979) (Duniway, 
J., dissenting). A bank acquired a computer program and attempted to recover costs by 
deducting them as a business expense under I.R.C. 5 162(a). The Commissioner disal- 
lowed the deductions, arguing that the acquisition costs were for franchise rights and 
therefore should have been capitalized accordingly. The court held in favor of the bank. 
In dissent, Judge Duniway used the player piano analogy, not to define a tangiblelintan- 
gible distinction, but to define an expeminglcapitalization distinction. The analogy, al- 
though well phrased for the tangiblelintangible distinction, may not have been as apt in 
the context in which it was used. 
78. A program performs work only when a copy has been loaded into the central 
processing unit hardware. Internal hardware circuitry then reacts in predetermined ways. 
79. See State v. Central Computer Servs., Inc. 349 So. 2d 1160, 1162 (Ala. 1977); 
Nova Computing Servs., Inc. v. Askew, [I9801 6 COMPUTER L. SERV. REP. (BIGELOW) 18, 
26, 27 (Fla. Div. Admin. Hearings 1976); Puritan Life Ins. Co., [I9801 7 COMPUTER L.
SERV. REP. (BIGELOW) 481, 483,484 (R.I. Tax Div. 1979); Commerce Union Bank v. Tid- 
well, 538 S.W.2d 405, 407-08 (Tenn. 1976); First Nat'l Bank of Fort Worth v. Bullock, 
584 S.W.2d 548, 550 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979). 
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programmer input and telecommunication transfer. Because 
software may also be transferred in the latter two ways, the 
courts and the tax authorities have imprudently moved towards 
intangibility, reasoning that the lack of a tangible medium in all 
possible transfers demonstrates that the object of the transac- 
tion must be intangible. 
Because it is possible to "bring" a program to a vendee 
merely "in the mind" of a programmer, the courts have errone- 
ously concluded that the essence of any software transaction is 
truly a service.80 Although this construction of software by direct 
programmer input is not amenable to sales and use taxes, since 
there is no sale of a tangible product, a tangible product is none- 
theless created at the buyer's situs and should be subject to any 
property, sales or use taxes should the product be thereafter re- 
tained or sold. This judicial error arises because of the courts' 
failure to properly apply a traditional product/service analysis to 
a technologically new product. 
Possible input via telecommunications transmission also 
stymied the courts; since no visual media had been employed in 
the sale, the courts reasoned that no transfer of a tangible prod- 
uct had been effected.81 The tax authorities have contributed to 
the problem by refusing to impose sales and use taxes upon the 
telecommunications-transferred software, while at the same time 
assessing the complaining taxpayer's visible-media transferred 
software.82 This inconsistency may have been construed by the 
courts to be an admission of the intangibility of the object of the 
transaction. 
A technologically sound argument has been made, however, 
for the proposition that software transferred by telecommunica- 
tions does indeed result in the transfer of a tangible product. 
80. See State v. Central Computer Servs., Inc., 349 So. 2d 1160, 1162 (Ala. 1977); 
Nova Computing Servs., Inc. v. Askew, [I9801 6 COMPUTER L. SERV. REP. (BIGELOW) 18, 
26, 27 (Fla. Div. Admin. Hearings 1976); Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538 S.W.2d 
405,407-08 (Tenn. 1976); First Nat'l Bank of Fort Worth v. Bullock, 584 S.W.2d 548,550 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1979). 
81. See State v. Central Computer Servs., Inc., 349 So. 2d 1160, 1162 (Ala. 1977); 
Nova Computing Servs., Inc. v. Askew, [I9801 6 COMPUTER L. SERV. REP. (BIGELOW) 18, 
26-27 (Fla. Div. Admin. Hearings 1976); Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538 S.W.2d 
405,407-08 (Tenn. 1976); First Nat'l Bank of Fort Worth v. Bullock, 584 S.W.2d 548,550 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1979). See also Bullock v. Statistical Tabulating Corp., 549 S.W.2d 166, 
167 (Tex. 1977) (characterizing machine-coded data as intangible). 
82. Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538 S.W.2d 405, 407-08 (Tenn. 1976). See 
also Nova Computing Servs., Inc. v. Askew, [I9801 6 COMPUTER L. SERV. REP. (BIGELOW) 
18, 27 (Fla. Div. Admin. Hearings 1976). 
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One writer, arguing for UCC protection of software transactions, 
has extended the concept of the sale of tangible goods under the 
UCC to that of telecommunication transfers of software, citing 
case authority for analogous electricity  sale^.^ 
B. Misapplication of Sound Authority 
Software, as has been previously discussed, occasionally has 
received the characterization of tangibility. Greyhound con- 
cluded that systems software, at the least, is tangible property. 
Without specifically stating as much, the Service, with its bun- 
dling exception, permits the taxpayer to treat software as a tan- 
gible asset. Software courts have nonetheless overlooked or mis- 
applied these characterizations and those of the film industry. 
1. Inadequate Disposition of Film Industry Para1 lels 
The courts in the earliest and therefore most critical 
software tax decisions were obliged to either follow or dist- 
inguish film industry authority. Unfortunately, they disposed of 
that parallel authority summarily. The United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit distinguished Uni- 
versal from the notable District of Columbia v. Norwood Stu- 
dios, Inc. decision? which had been rendered by the same 
court, simply on the ground that the Norwood Studios vendor 
had retained no interest in the film product after the sale, 
whereas the Universal vendor had restricted the use of one of 
the furnished programs.86 
Other courts have concluded that film industry decisions are 
not applicable to software disputes, reasoning that the transfer 
medium is critical to the film product but only incidental to the 
software p r o d ~ c t . ~  Justice Maddox's dissent in State v. Central 
Computer Services, Inc? questioned the logic of this rationale. 
Because software may be transferred by telecommunications or 
83. Note, Computer Programs as Goods Under the U.C.C., supra note 53, at 1153 
n.21 (citing Helvey v. Wabash County REMC, 151 Ind. App. 176, 278 N.E.2d 608 (1972); 
Wivagg v. Duquesne Light Co., 73 Pa. D. & C.2d 694 (1975)). See also Annot., 40 
A.L.R.3d 1060 (1973). 
84. 336 F.2d 746 (D.C. Cir. 1964). 
85. District of Columbia v. Universal Computer Assocs., Inc., 465 F.2d 615, 618-19 
(D.C. Cir. 1972). 
86. State v. Central Computer Serva., Inc., 349 So. 2d 1160, 1162 (Ala. 1977); Com- 
merce Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538 S.W.2d 405, 407-08 (Tenn. 1976). 
87. 349 So. 2d 1160 ( A h  1977). 
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direct programmer input, the majority had concluded that the 
film industry decisions did not apply. Seeing little difference be- 
tween the use of the medium by film makers and its use by 
software manufacturers, Justice Maddox countered by observing 
that the film product may also be transmitted by telecommuni- 
cations and reproduced by actors.88 
2. Improper Application of Revenue Procedure 69-21 
The critical Universal decision misconstrued the Service's 
partial tangibility rule when it characterized all software as in- 
tangible. Section 4 of Revenue Procedure 69-218@ allows the tax- 
payer to treat software as a tangible asset with the hardware if 
originally bundled with the hardware. In Universal, the taxpayer 
had purchased a bundled package from IBM.*O The Universal 
court, however, inappropriately applied the procedure's evalua- 
tion of intangibility for unbundled, separately acquired software 
purchases to Universal's bundled software purchases.@l The 
court would not have reached this conclusion had it properly ap- 
plied the parallel portion of Procedure 69-21 pertaining to bun- 
dled purchases of software. 
3. Improper Application of Greyhound's Tangibility Rule 
The Greyhound court, relying on somewhat vague reason- 
ing, characterized systems software as tangible, and exempted as 
intangible all other items the state sought to tax-systems engi- 
neering services, educational services, and maintenan~e.~ Subse- 
quent courts, however, have apparently overlooked Greyhound's 
distinction between tangible and intangible items and have cited 
Greyhound as authority for an intangible characterization of all 
software,@3 including systems software. This manifest inconsis- 
tency may be explained by the complexity of the subject matter 
coupled with the Greyhound court's vagaries. 
88. Id. at 1164, 1165. 
89. See notes 27-33 and accompanying text supra. 
90. District of Columbia v. Universal Computer Assocs., Inc., 465 F.2d 615, 617 
(D.C. Cir. 1972). 
91. Rev. Proc. 69-21, 1969-2 C.B. 303, 3 4. 
92. Greyhound Computer Corp. v. State Dep't of Assessments & Taxation, 271 Md. 
674, 678, 320 A.2d 52, 55 (1974). 
93. See Honeywell Information Syss., Inc. v. Maricopa County, 118 Ariz. 171, 173, 
575 P.2d 801, 803 (Ct. App. 1978); Honeywell Information Syss., Inc., v. Board of Assess- 
ment Appeals, [I9801 7 COMPUTER L. SEW. REP. (BIGELOW) 486 (Colo. Dist. Ct. 1975). 
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C. Deferential Rulings for the Taxpayer 
Within the realm of tax law, a unique multijurisdictional 
policy of deferential treatment of the taxpayer on the ground of 
ambiguity has persisted for years." When relevant authority has 
been unpersuasive or weak, the courts have generally rendered 
pro-taxpayer decisions. This has contributed, however, to a firm 
stare decisis rule of intangibility on the basis of ambiguity for 
certain software  decision^.@^ 
IV. A NEED FOR CONSISTENT ANGIBILITY ' 
A. Consistency 
Consistency is essential if equitable treatment of industry 
participants is to be maintained. Current inconsistency unfairly 
favors the software manufacturer over manufacturers of other 
products and favors certain software manufacturers over other 
software manufacturers within the industry. 
1. Industry-External Inequities 
The status quo inconsistency, preferred by some in the in- 
dustry,.. is most inequitable between the software manufacturer 
and the manufacturer of analogous products. Software manufac- 
turers obtain or seek to obtain federal investment tax credits ac- 
cruing to vendors of tangible products. However, in those states 
where courta have ruled that software is intangible, software 
manufacturers have successfully avoided the property, sales, and 
use taxes borne by manufacturers of analogous products. 
2. Industry-Internal Inequities 
Because Revenue Procedure 69-21 permits a vendee to lump 
bundled software costs with those of hardware but requires dif- 
ferent treatment for unbundled acquisitions,@' two specific 
94. E.g., Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151,153 (1917). See also 3 C. SANDS, STATUTES & 
STATUTORY CONSTRUCIION 5 66.01 (4th ed. 1972). 
95. See Nova Computing Servs., Inc. v. Askew, [1980] 6 COMPUTER L. SERV. REP. 
(BIGELOW) 18, 28 (Fla. Div. Admin. Hearings 1976); First Nat'l Bank of Fort Worth v. 
Bullock, 584 S.W.2d 5CS, 551 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979). See also Bullock v. Statistical Tabu- 
lating Corp., 549 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Tex. 1977) (characterizing machine-coded data as in- 
tangible); Janesville Data Center, Inc. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 84 Wis. 2d 341, 
345-46, 267 N.W.2d 656, 658 (1978) (characterizing machine-coded data as intangible). 
96. Myers, supra note 64, a t  75. 
97. See notea 27-33 and accompanying text supra. 
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problems arise from the resulting market distortion. First, a ven- 
dee of bundled software possesses a definite and perhaps sizea- 
ble tax advantage over a vendee of identical unbundled software. 
Secondly, that tax advantage, economically transmitted to the 
hardware vendor, induces the hardware vendor to withstand 
market forces to unbundle, thereby hindering technological de- 
velopment of competitive software systems in the independent 
software industry. 
B. Tangibility 
For technological purposes software is tangible. Not only 
should the tangiblelintangible inconsistency within the law be 
eliminated, the ultimate characterization should fall on the side 
of tangibility for several reasons. 
The preservation of a definition of software as being intan- 
gible would perpetuate a legal-technological paradox. Proper 
recognition of software as being tangible is demanded by a sys- 
tem of laws that seeks to avoid fiction. 
Moreover, a characterization of software as tangible would 
permit state and local revenue agencies to tap a large source of 
potential revenue. Exponential growth in the industry is inevita- 
ble; the software manufacturing industry grew from virtually 
nothing in the 1960'ss8 to an estimated $70.7 billion in 1980, up 
from $43.1 billion in 1976.= 
Finally, a continued characterization of software as intangi- 
ble by the Service imposes a burden upon the software manufac- 
turer not borne by manufacturers and owners of tangible prod- 
ucts. This burden stems not from inconsistencies of 
characterization within the industry but from a characterization 
of software as intangible by the Service; the burden may be rem- 
edied simply by a repeal of Revenue Procedure 69-21. 
98. Goetz, When IBM Unbundled, supra note 3, a t  35. 
99. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584,587 n.7 (1978). Emerging innovations can do noth- 
ing but hasten the industry's growth. The increased availability of communications links 
between computer systems wil l  cause transactional costs associated with the creation and 
sale of software products to plummet as vendors transfer those products to the vendee in 
fractional seconds. Distributive processing systems, the computing industry's major focus 
for the 1980's, will give remote users cheap access to massive central mainframe systems, 
which in turn will place huge demands upon the development of corresponding software 
capabilities. See generally H. KATZAN, DISTRIBUTIVE INFORMATION SYSTEMS (1979); D. 
MCGLYNN, supra note 17; M. DERTOUZOS & J. MOSES, THE COMPUTER AGE (1979). 
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The solution is simple and does not necessitate special legis- 
lation; all that is required is a reasonable construction of ex- 
isting revenue statutes. The proper introduction of trade usage 
would encourage the courts to construe revenue statutes in a 
reasonable manner. Such construction is preferable to a con- 
struction conditioned by an "a priori bias against the collec- 
tibility [of taxes in general]."loO Because tax laws often extend 
into technical fields, reference to scientific facts, trade meaning, 
and commercial usage are all relevant to statutory construe- 
tion.lol The courts must often reevaluate technical common law 
definitions when precise distinctions are impractical or techno- 
logically obsolete.loS 
This characterization of software as intangible stems from a 
variety of mistakes. Poor factual input and reasoning that is 
technologically inaccurate have served as the bases for poor pre- 
cedent. Prior authority, which may have been based on sound 
technological reasoning or results, has been ignored or misap- 
plied by later courts grasping for persuasive authority. Where 
authority has been weak or the evidence ambiguous, courts have 
rendered pro-taxpayer decisions. 
A consistent treatment of software as tangible in all relevant 
areas of the law is preferable to the only other alternatives: (1) 
inconsistent treatment or (2) treatment as an intangible. Consis- 
tent treatment would equalize the legal benefits and burdens 
within and without the software industry. It would place the 
software manufacturer in a legal posture similar to that of the 
manufacturers of technologically analogous products. Treatment 
of software as a tangible would also reflect the nature of the 
product ,as it is viewed by its manufacturers and users. New 
legislation is not needed to insure consistent treatment which 
would treat software as a tangible. All that is required is the 
simple and reasonable construction of existing revenue statutes. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
State courts with tax jurisdiction and the Internal Revenue 
Senrice have generally characterized software as an intangible 
product and asset. This characterization exempts software from 
100. 3 C. SANDS, supra note 93, § 66.02. 
101. Id. 66.03. 
102. Id. 
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state and local sales, use, and personal property taxes, which 
turn upon the issue of tangibility. The Service's characterization 
largely denies federal investment credit benefits for the software 
owner and precludes tangible capitalizaton and depreciation for 
separately acquired software. 
This characterization of software as intangible is inconsis- 
tent with state and federal tax court chpracterizations of analo- 
gous products, state court characterizations of software in con- 
tract disputes, and pervasive trade usage. 
Robert D. Crockett 
